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THE REDUCTION IN SELLER LIABILITY UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933: GOOD NEWS FOR
SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) to
protect investors from the manipulative activities that preceded the stock
market crash of 1929.1 To protect securities investors against manipulative
selling practices, Congress, in section 122 of the Securities Act, imposes two
significant liabilities on any individual who offers or sells securities in
violation of the Securities Act's provisions.' First, section 12(1) of the
Securities Act imposes financial liability on any person who offers or sells
securities in violation of the registration or prospectus requirements listed
in section 5 of the Securities Act.4 Second, section 12(2) of the Securities
Act imposes financial liability on any person who offers or sells securities
by means of a materially misleading prospectus or a materially misleading
oral corimunication. 5 Although the Securities Act defines the meaning of
1. See Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (statements of Congressman
Sabbath) (stating that Congress enacted Securities Act of 1933 to remedy manipulative practices
that caused economic downfall in America). See generally Landis, The Legislative History Of
The Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WAsK. L. REv. 29 (1959) (stating that Congress intended
Securities Act of 1933 to reduce factors that resulted in market crash of 1929); Douglas &
Bates, Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933) (discussing social and financial
forces that resulted in enactment of Securities Act).
2. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title I, § 12, 48 Stat. 84 (1933) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) provides:
Any person who-
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e [the registration require-
ments] of this title, or
(2) offers or sells a security... by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in commerce or of the mails, by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of material
fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading... shall
be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration
paid. for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the
security.
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982); see infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (explaining
liabilities imposed upon individuals violating § 12 of Securities Act).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982); see supra note 2 (setting forth text to § 12(1) of Securities
Act); infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing elements of § 12(1) cause of action).
The Securities Act's registration requirements are set forth in § 5 of the Securities Act. See
15 U.S.C. § 77e (explaining when entities must register securities).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982); see supra note 2 (setting forth text of § 12(2) of the
Securities Act; infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing elements of § 12(2) cause
of action).
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 46:629
the terms "sale" and "sell", the Securities Act does not define the term
"seller" .6 In the absence of language in the Securities Act defining or
clarifying the meaning of the term "seller", the federal courts have assumed
the responsibility of determining which persons constitute sellers under
section 12 of the Securities Act.
7
In the 1940's federal courts generally held that an individual was a
seller under section 12 of the Securities Act (section 12 seller) if the individual
passed .title to securities to a buyer or solicited an offer to buy securities
from a buyer of securities. 8 The definition of a section 12 seller changed
very little until the early 1960's when the federal courts began expanding
the class of persons that qualified as section 12 sellers. 9 The expansion came
to a peak in the 1970's and 1980's when a number of federal circuit courts
adopted the substantial factor test.'0 Under the substantial factor test, any
person whose activities constituted a substantial factor in causing a securities
transaction to occur qualified as a seller under section 12.11 Other circuits
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982) (defining terms "sale", "sell", "offer to sale", and
"offer to sell"). Section 2(3) of the Securities Act defines the term "sale" or "sell" as "every
contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value." Id. Section
2(3) also defines the term "offer to sell" or "offer to sale" to include "every attempt or
offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security, for value". Id; see Lawler
v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287-1288 (4th Cir. 1978) (discussing Securities Act's lack of
definition for term "seller"); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, (2d Cir. 1969)
(same); Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 1955) (same); Loss, THm FUNDAMENTALS
OF SEcURITIEs REGULATION 1016 (1988) (discussing various ways that federal courts define term
"seller").
7. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2076 (1988) (explaining that because
Securities Act nowhere defines term "seller" federal courts must define term "seller"); Davis
v. Avco Fin. Serv. Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1064 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1359, 470
U.S. 1005 (1984) (considering the meaning of the term "seller" in § 12 of Securities Act);
Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940) (wrestling with
meaning of term "seller" under § 12 of Securities Act).
8. See Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988, 990-991 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705
(1940) (holding securities broker liable as seller under § 12 even though securities broker did
not pass title of securities to purchaser because broker solicited offer to buy securities from
purchaser). Although the statutory language of § 12 appears to include only persons that
actually pass title to securities to the purchaser of the securities, early commentators noted
that the language of § 12 does not require an individual to actually pass title to the securities
to qualify as a seller of securites under § 12. See Douglas & Bates, supra note 1, at 206-207
(stating that scope of § 12 is wide enough to encompass more than individuals who pass title
to securities to purchasers).
9. See Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F.Supp. 59, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (outlining
proximate cause test of seller liability which expands definition of seller beyond previous
interpretations of § 12); infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text (discussing Lennerth decision
and proximate cause test of seller liability).
10. See Lewis v. Walston & Co. Inc., 487 F.2d 617, 622 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that
defendant constituted § 12 seller because defendant was substantial factor in causing sale of
securities); infra notes 88-132 (discussing substantial factor test and noting circuit courts that
adopted substantial factor test).
11. See Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that appropriate
definition of § 12 seller includes individuals who are substantial factor in causing sale of
securities).
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refused to adopt the substantial factor test and instead developed alternative
definitions to determine which persons co nstituite sellers under section 12.1i
In 1988 the United States Supreie Cour, in Pint~r v;Dfah' 3, considered
the coiflicting definitions in the federal circuit courts and rejected the
fifteen-year old substantial factor test in favor of a more restrictive definitidn
of the term "seller". 14 The Pinter Couirit defined a section 12 seller as any
person who, motivated by the person's own fihancial g~in or the financial
gain of the owner of the securities, passes title to the securities or solicits
the purchase of securities. 15 By restricting the definition of a section 12
seller, the Pinter decision reduced th- likelihood that sedtion 12 liability will
attach to a securities professional.'
6
The emphasis on which persons constitute section 12 sellers stems fionr
the significant liabilities that Congress chose to place on sellers.' 7 Section
12 of. the Securities Act imposes liability on persons for violating the
Securities Act in two distinct situations.18 First' section 12(1 imposes liability
on a seller of securities for every security that the seller sells to a purchaser
in violation of the registration and prospectus requirements set forth in
section 5 of the Securities Act. 19 Second, section 12(2) imposes liability on
a seller if the seller makes an offer to sell securities or actually sells securities
to a purchaser by means of a materially misleading prospectus or a materially
misleading oral communication.
20
To bring a claim against a seller under section 12(1), a purchaser must
establish three distinct elements.2' First, the purchaser must prove that the
12. See Akerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc., 810 'F.2d 336, 344 (2nd Cir. 1987)
(stating that definition of seller includes persons passing title to securities to buyer and persons
not passing title to securities if buyer proves that seller possessed scienter); infra notes 134-35
and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit privity and scienter test for qualification as
§ 12 seller); Anderson v. Aurotek 774 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that definition of
§ 12 seller includes persons whose acts are both necessary to and substantial factor in sales
transaction); infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's necessary to
and substantial factor test for qualification as § 12 seller); Collins v. Signetics Corp. 605 F.2d
110, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that except where some special relationship exists between
owner of securities and seller, such as principal-agent relationship, purchaser must be in privity
with seller); infra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's privity or
controlling relationship test for qualification as § 12 seller).
13. 108 S.Ct. 2063 (1988).
14. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2082 (1988) (rejecting substantial factor test because
based on incorrect construction of § 12 and adopting a two part test); infra notes 177-82 and
accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's rejection of substantial factor test and explain-
ing new two part test for determining who constitutes § 12 seller).
15. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2079; see infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (discussing
Pinter Court two part test for determining § 12 seller status).
16. See Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2081 (stating that definition of § 12 seller should not include
securities professionals merely performing legal work).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1)-(2) (1982); see supra note 2 (setting out § 12 of Securities Act).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982); see supra note 2 (setting forth § 12 of Securities Act).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982).
20. Id. at § 771(2) (1982).
21. See Swenson v. Englestad, 626 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating elements needed
1989]
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defendant qualifies as the type of seller that section 12 aims to punish for
violating the registration and prospectus requirements of section 5 of the
Securities Act.Y Second, the purchaser must prove that the seller used the
mails or some other type of interstate communication to offer or sell
securities to the purchaser. 23 Third, the purchaser must prove that in offering
or selling securities to the purchaser the seller failed to comply with the
registration or prospectus requirement of section 5 of the Securities Act. 24
To bring a claim against a seller under section 12(2), a purchaser must
also prove three distinct elements. 25 First, the purchaser must prove that
to establish prima facie case under § 12(1) of Securities Act); Hill York Corp. v. American
Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 686 (1971) (discussing necessary elements of prima fade
case under section 12(1) of Securities Act).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982); see Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises Inc.,
448 F.2d 680, 686 (1971) (stating that qualification as seller necessary for liability under §
12(1)); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981) (same); Swenson v. Englestad,
626 F.2d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Lewis v. Walston & Co. Inc., 487 F.2d 617, 621
(5th Cir. 1973) (same). Determining what activities qualify a participant in a securities
transaction as a § 12 seller is a controversial issue in § 12 cases. See Abrams, The Scope of
Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: "Participation" and the Pertinent
Legislative Materials, 15 FoRD. URB. L. J. 877, 949 (1987) (reviewing various opinions but
concluding that only persons transferring title to buyer are liable under § 12). See generally
Note, Seller Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Proximate Cause-
Substantial Factor Approach Limited by a Duty of Inquiry, 36 VAD. L. REv. 361 (1983)
(surveying various tests for determining persons status as § 12 seller).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982); see Aid Auto Stores, Inc. v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468, 470
(2d Cir. 1975) (stating that interstate communication or use of mails required for § 12(1)
liability). The predominant view on the use of mails or interstate communication is that the
defendant must make an offer by mail or interstate oral communication or make the offer by
oral communication and make the delivery of the security by mail. Creswell-Keith, Inc. v.
Willingham, 264 F.2d 76, 82 (8th Cir. 1959); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.
1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d
875, 877 (2d Cir. 1943). Some jurisdictions use the broadest view of the interstate requirement
and require only some use of the mails or interstate oral communication in the course of the
transaction between the buyer and the seller. Schneider and Zall, Section 12(1) and the
Imperfect Exempt Transaction: The Proposed I & I Defense, 28 Bus. LAw. 1011, 1021 (1973)
(stating that use of intrastate mail and intrastate telephone satisfy § 12 requirement of interstate
communication or use of mail). Other circuits apply a very narrow interpretation of the
interstate communication requirement. See Franklin Savings Bank v. Levy, 406 F.Supp. 40,
42 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1977) (interpreting interstate
communication requirement to exclude intrastate use of telephone).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982). The seller's knowledge of the § 5 violation is irrelevant
because § 12(1) of the Securities Act is a strict liability statute. SEC v. Holshuh, 694 F.2d
130, 137 n.10 (7th Cir. 1982); Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1973);
Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 694 n.19 (5th Cir. 1971);
Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co., [Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,034 at
93,459 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). One major difference between the requirements under §
12(1) and § 12(2) is that § 12(2) applies to all securities whether registered or exempt from §
5 registration whereas § 12(1) applies only to securities that are not exempt from registration
and are illegally unregistered. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchise, Inc., 448 F.2d
680, 695 (5th Cir. 1971). In most cases the registration exemptions of §§ 3 and 4 of the
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the defendant qualifies as a seller of the securities. 26 Second, the purchaser
must prove that the seller sold the securities by means of the mail or
interstate communication. 27 Third, the purchaser must prove that, in the
process of selling the securities to the purchaser the seller made an untrue
statement of material fact or omitted a material fact that made a statement
misleading.Y
Section 12 places substantial liability on every seller who violates the
requirements of section 12(1) or 12(2).29 If a seller violates either part of
section 12, the seller is liable to every purchaser to whom the seller
improperly sold securities. 30 The total amount of the seller's liability depends
on whether a purchaser still owns the securities purchased from the seller
at the time that a court enters judgment for the purchaser.3' If the purchaser
still owns the securities, the purchaser can recover from the seller the
consideration the purchaser paid for the securities plus accrued interest.3 2
If, however, the purchaser no longer owns the securities, the purchaser can
recover the difference between the amount that the purchaser paid for the
securities and the amount the purchaser received from the resale of the
securities plus any accrued interest.
3
Securities Act do not alleviate a seller's liability under § 12. Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d
108, 116 (10th Cir. 1959); Loss, supra note 6, at 887. One exception to the rule exists and
that is securities covered by § 3(a)(2) exemptions are outside the purview of § 12. Id.
26. See Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1359 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that to recover
under § 12(2) plaintiffs must prove that defendant was seller of securities); HAzeN, THE LAW
OF SEcuRnirs REGULAMON 184 (1985) (stating that identifying permissible defendants under
§ 12(2) is question of who constitutes seller of securities).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). See supra note 23 (discussing limits of interstate commu-
nication requirement).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). Section 12(2) provides a seller with a statutory defense.
Id. The defense requires the seller to prove that the seller did not know and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission of facts in connection
with the sale of securities. Id. Courts considering a defense under § 12(2) generally require
the defendant to prove that the defendant could not have known of the untruth or omission
which is a heavier burden of proof than the reasonably could not have known standard of
the statute. Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826, 829 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976); Gilbert v. Nixon,
429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970); DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 841-43 (2d Cir. 1968); First
Trust & Savings Bank of Zanesville Ohio v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 214 F.2d 320 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954); Loss, supra note 6, at 895. The plaintiff need not
prove reliance on the misstatement or omission to recover under § 12(2). Wigund v. Flo-Tek,
Inc., 609 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1979); Alton Box Board Co. v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,
560 F.2d 916, 919 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). See Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 475 (2d cir. 1988)
(holding defendants liable for $522,500 worth of limited partnerships sold to plaintiffs); Lewis
v. Walston, 487 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir 1973) (concluding defendant liable for $70,000 worth
of securities sold to plaintiff).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. If the purchaser brings a claim against a seller under § 12(2) of the Securities
Act and the seller was a broker, § 12 entitles the purchaser to the entire amount paid for the
security without deduction of a transaction commission. Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis,
251 F.2d 269, 276 (10th Cir. 1957).
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Because section 12 only imposes liability on defendants who qualify as
section 12 sellers, many defendants claim that they do not qualify as section
12 sellers.3 4 Moreover, because section 12(1) and 12(2) both require a
purchaser to prove that a defendant is a section 12 seller before the defendant
becomes liable to the purchaser, the question of who constitutes a section
12 seller lies at the heart of every section 12 claim.
35
When Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933, Congress defined
the terms "sale", "sell", "offer to sell" and "offer for sale". 3 6 However,
Congress did not define the term "seller". 37 In the absence of a statutory
definition for the term "seller", the federal courts developed several tests
for determining when an individual qualifies as a section 12 seller.38 The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Cady v. Murphy
39
was one of the first courts to address the question of who constitutes a
section 12 seller.40 In Cady a securities broker telephoned Murphy to
recommend that Murphy purchase some shares in the South American
Utilities Corporation.4' In the course of the conversation with Murphy, the
broker made several false representations about the financial history of
South American Utilities.42 Relying on the representations made by the
broker, Murphy purchased stock in South American Utilities. 43 Soon there-
after Murphy discovered that the stock was worthless." The broker's firm
34. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1113 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating
that all defendants defended against the action by asserting that none of the defendants
qualified as § 12 sellers); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1286 (4th Cir. 1978) (same); Ahern
v. Gaussoin, 611 F.Supp. 1465, 1485 (D.C.Or. 1985) (same).
35. See HAZEN, supra note 26, at 184 (explaining that § 12 seller status is central to any
§ 12 cause of action). Although the definition of the term "seller" lies at the heart of § 12
liability, many federal courts decline to draw a distinction between those actions that qualify
a defendant as a seller under § 12(1) of the Securities Act and those actions that qualify a
defendant as a seller under § 12(2) of the Securities Act. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co. 858 F.2d
1104, 1115 (5th Cir. 1988); Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir.
1943).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982). See supra note 6 (setting forth § 12's definition of terms
"sale", "sell", "offer to sell", and "offer for sale").
37. See Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2076 (noting that Securities Act does not define
seller for purpose of § 12 liability).
38. See infra notes 132-137 and accompanying text (discussing various tests applied by
federal circuit courts of appeal).
39. 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
40. Cady v. Murhpy, 113 F.2d 988, 989 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
41. Id. In Cady the plaintiff was a small securities broker and dealer doing business in
Maine. Id.
42. Cady v. Murphy, 30 F.Supp. 466, 467 (D. Me. 1939). In Cady the broker stated
falsely that South American Utilities Corporation (South American) had the support of Chase
Bank of New York and that Chase thought that South American's stock was a solid investment.
Id. at 467-68.
43. Cady, 30 F.Supp at 468.
44. Id. In Cady one member of the brokerage house that employed Cady as a broker
referred to the stock of South American Utilities as "junk" at the time of the sale to Murphy.
Id.
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refused to buy the securities back from Murphy, forcing Murphy to sell the
securities at a substantial loss. 4 Murphy commenced an action against the
broker in the District Court of the United States for the District of Maine.
46
Murphy claimed that the broker violated section 12(2) of the Securities Act
by selling securities to Murphy by means of materially misleading state-
ments.47 Before the district court, the broker argued that liability under
section 12(2) only applies to the owner of securities when the owner sells
the securities to a purchaser. 48 According to the broker, section 12(2) should
not apply to the broker because the broker never owned the securities.
4 9
The district court in Cady noted that the definition of the term "to sell"
in section 2(3) of the Securities Act provides that an individual must solicit
an offer to buy securities to qualify as selling the securities. 0 The district
court noted that the broker in Cady solicited an offer to buy securities
from Murphy.5' The district court, therefore, found that the broker consti-
tuted a seller under section 12. 52 Asserting that the broker did not qualify
as a seller, the broker appealed the district court decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.5 3 The First Circuit in Cady
affirmed the decision of the district court and adopted the district court
holding that an individual is a section 12 seller if the individual solicits an
offer to buy securities.5 4 Following the First Circuit decision in Cady a
number of courts adopted the conclusion in Cady that section 12 imposes
liability on the seller even without privity between the buyer and the seller.
55
45. Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988, 990 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
Before attempting to return the securities in Cady, Murphy repurchased all the South American
stock Murphy sold to Murphy's customers. Cady v Murphy, 30 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D. Me.
1939).
46. Cady, 30 F. Supp. at 467.
47. Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
48. Id. at 989.
49. Id. at 990.
50. Id. The district court in Cady made an important decision to apply the definition
of the term "sale" or "offer to sell" in a § 12 case because the injection of the idea of
solicitation into the definition of a § 12 seller allowed expansion of § 12 liability beyond
purchasers in privity with the owner of the securities. Cady v. Murphy, 30 F. Supp. 466, 469
(D. Me. 1939). The construction of § 12 adopted by the district court allowed the district
court to expand § 12 liability to include brokers selling securities for other persons holding
title to the securities. Id.
51. Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988, 990 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
52. Id. at 990.
53. Id. The broker in Cady argued that only the owner of the securities qualified as a
§ 12 seller because only the owner passed title in the securities to the buyer. Id.
54. Id. The First Circuit in Cady agreed with the district court that in common parlance
a person who sells is not only the owner of an object but also the owner's agent authorized
to sell the object to a third person. Id.
55. Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F. 2d 868 (8th Cir. 1955); Wall v Wagner, 125 F. Supp. 854,
858 (D. Neb. 1954); Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,923 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1959), after trial, id. at 91,034. The use
of § lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to bring claims against sellers probably
caused the scarcity of § 12 cases prior to the 19701s. See O'Hara, Erosion of the Privity
1989]
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Beginning in the 1960's the federal courts began expanding the definition
of a section 12 seller far beyond the definition the First Circuit adpoted in
Cady.56 The opinion of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio in Lennerth v. Mendenhal5 7 was largely responsible for
the expansion of the definition of section 12 seller.', In Lennerth an employee
of World Wide Automatic Archery Corporation (Archery Corporation)
arranged three meetings with the Lennerth family to discuss the financial
rewards of purchasing stock in the Archery Corporation. 9 At each of the
meetings, the employee told the Lennerths that the Archery Corporation
was financially healthy 0 To improve the employee's credibility, the em-
ployee asked Mr. Hegg, the vice president of the Archery Corporation, to
attend one of the meetings with the Lennerths. 61 Although the employee
solicited an offer to buy stock in the Archery Corporation from the
Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller,
31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 921, 922-923 (stating that § 12(2) of Securities Act of 1933 is merely a
weak stepsister to more powerful § 10(b) of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). Rule lOb-
5 prohibits anyone engaging in a securities transaction from making untrue statements of
material facts or omitting facts necessary to make statements true or from engaging in practices
that operate a fraud on any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). Although § l0b of the Securities Exchange Act and rule lOb-5
do not grant expressly a private right of action, federal courts interpret § 10b and rule lob-5
to provide an implicit private right of action. See Herman & Mclean v. Huddleston, 103 S.Ct.
683, 687 (1983) (stating that § 10b implicitly provides private right of action to individuals).
In the early 1970's, the United States Supreme Court tightened the requirements necessary for
an individual to successfully bring a lOb-5 claim and the stricter requirements contributed to
the rise in the number of claims brought under § 12(2) of the Securities Act. See O'Hara,
supra, at 924-26 (explaining increase in popularity of bringing claims under § 12(2) as opposed
to rule lOb-5).
56. See Abrams, supra note 22, at 886-87 (stating that 1964 Lennerth decision of Fifth
Circuit expanded definition of term "seller" without regard for statutory language of Securities
Act); O'Hara, supra note 55, at 973-74 (stating that courts adopting proximate cause test
promulgated in 1964 Lennerth decision significantly expanded § 12(2) liability); supra notes
56-131 and accompanying text (discussing expansion of definition of § 12 seller beginning in
1964).
57. 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
58. See Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (applying
proximate cause theory to securities sales transaction).
59. Lennerth, 234 F. Supp. at 64. In Lennerth, the World Wide Archery Corporation
(Archery Corporation) used newspaper articles to entice individual purchasers to purchase
stock in the Archery Corporation. Id. at 63. After reading one of the articles, the Lennerths
arranged a meeting with the employee to discuss the advantages of investing in the Archery
Corporation. Id. at 65. According to the employee, the Archery Corporation would use the
capital raised by the sale of Archery Corporation's common stock to build a sales center in
Cleveland, Ohio. Id.
60. Id. at 64. In Lennerth, at the first meeting between the employee and the Lennerths,
the employee described the Archery Corporation as extremely successful and heavily financed.
Id. At the second meeting between the employee and the Lennerths, the employee told the
Lennerth's that the Archery Corporation was financially healthy and displayed a pictorial
resume of the proposed sales center. Id.
61. Id. In Lennerth, Hegg assured the Lennerths of the financial health of the Archery
Corporation. Id.
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Lennerths, the employee did not attend the actual transfer of stock from
the Archery Corporation to the Lennerths.6 2 The Archery Corporation never
registered the securities that the corporation sold to the Lennerths with the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).63 After the Lennerths discovered
that the Archery Corporation was not as financially healthy as the employee
had told the Lennerths, the Lennerths commenced an action against the
employee and against Hegg in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio.64 The Lennerths alleged that both the employee
and Hegg violated section 12(1) of the Securities Act by selling securities to
the Lennerths without complying with the registration requirement of section
5 of the Act.
6
The district court in Lennerth made a lengthy evaluation of whether
the employee and Hegg qualified as section 12 sellers. 6 Relying on Cady,
the Lennerth court first stated that a broker can qualify as a section 12
seller even though the broker does not own the securities that the broker
sells. 67 The Lennerth court reasoned that the liberal remedial spirit of the
securities laws mandated that courts could not allow a person to escape
liability under section 12 simply because the person was not the actual
owner of illegally traded securities. 6 Borrowing principles from common-
law negligence, the Lennerth court decided that a person qualifies as a seller
under section 12 if a sale of the securities flows directly and proximately
from the person's actions. 69 Following the proximate cause theory of tort
law, the Lennerth court found that the Lennerths would not have purchased
62. Id.
63. Id. at 63.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 60. In Lennerth, the Lennerth's moved for summary judgment claiming that
the defendants violated the Securities Act by not registering the securities. Id. However, the
Lennerths did not specifically allege a violation of § 12 in the complaint. Id. Nevertheless, the
district court addressed the issue of whether the defendants violated § 12. Id. The Lennerth
court found that the Archery Corporation never registered the securities. Id. The Lennerth
court also found that the employee used the telephone to arrange the sale of the securities
which qualified as interstate communication. Id. The Lennerth court stated that the employee's
use of the telephone satisfied the interstate communication requirement of § 12 even though
the call originated and terminated in Ohio. Id. The district court reasoned that the character
of the instrument used and not whether the telephone lines crossed the state line is important
in determining the interstate communications requirement. Id.
66. Id. at 64-65.
67. Id. at 64. Although the district court in Lennerth acknowledged that brokers can be
liable for selling securities for the owner of the securities, the district court found that the
employee did not qualify as a broker. Id.
68. Id. at 65. In deciding Lennerth the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the liberal remedial
spirit of the federal securities laws suggests that the district court should deviate from the
requirement that privity exist between a buyer and a seller because culpable persons were going
unpunished. Id.
69. Id. The district court in Lennerth justified use of a proximate cause theory on the
assertion that Congress enacted the Securities Act with a liberal remedial purpose. Id. The
Lennerth court, however, failed to ground the justification for applying proximate cause theory
to specific statutory language of the Securities Act. Id.
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the Archery Corporation securities but for the activities of the employee
and Hegg.70 Because the Lennerth court found that the employee and Hegg
proximately caused the Lennerths to purchase the Archery Corporation
securities, the Lennerth court held that the employee and Hegg qualified as
section 12(1) sellers and were liable for damages under section 12(1).
71
In 1971, seven years after Lennerth, the Fifth Circuit in Hill York
Corp. v. American International Franchises72 expressly adopted the proxi-
mate cause test set forth by the district court in Lennerth, and began to
shape the substantial factor test.73 In Hill York the defendants, officers,
directors, and sole shareholders of American International Franchises, Inc.
(American), created a pyramiding scheme whereby local sales centers created
to fund restaurant frachises sold common stock in the local sales centers
and funneled the proceeds from the stock sales back to American. 74 The
local sales centers supposedly owned franchise rights to several restaurants,
but the sales centers never opened the restaurants. 7 The local sales centers
used brochures provided by American to solicit buyers and followed solic-
itation methods that American prescribed. 76 Many of the promotional bro-
chures contained false representations that the franchises were highly
70. Id. The district court in Lennerth determined that the employee's persuasion and
Hegg's credibility directly led to the Lennerth's purchase of Archery Corporation common
stock. Id. Going one step further, the Lennerth court found that the employee and Hegg were
not only the proximate cause of the Lennerths' purchase, but the employee and Hegg actually
enticed the Lennerths into investing in the corporation. Id. The district court supported the
statement that the employee and Hegg enticed the Lennerth's to buy Archery Corporation
common stock by drawing a now famous analogy between the defendants and hunters. Id.
The Lennerth court stated that a hunter enticing prey towards a trap is no less guilty than the
hunter that springs the snare and catches the prey. Id. Similarly, the Lennerth court analogized
that the employee and Hegg enticed the Lennerth's toward the purchase of securities and
someone else sprang the trap by consummating the sale of common stock to the Lennerths.
Id.
71. Id.
72. 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
73. Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 693 (5th Cir.
1971); see infra notes 89-133 and accompanying text (discussing origins and development of
substanital factor test).
74. Id. at 684. The defendants in Hill York developed a pyramid sales scheme to funnel
money from the sale of stock in the local sales centers to American International Franchises.
Id. The local sales centers supposedly would produce income for the investors by investing in
restaurant franchises. Id. Instead, the proceeds from the sale of the stock in the local sales
centers went back to the shareholders of American International Franchises because no actual
local restaurant franchises existed. Id. Because no actual restaurant franchises existed, the
defendants as sole stockholders of American International Franchises reaped the financial
benefits of any funds collected by the local representatives from the sale of stock in the local
sales centers. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 685. In Hill York the defendants gave the local representatives very detailed
instructions on methods of persuading investors to purchase stock in the local sales centers.
Id. The instructions included advice on what type of investors were most susceptible to the
purchase of the stock. Id. Also, the defendants explained to the local representatives the type
of sales pitch that was most effective in selling the securities. Id.
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successful. 77 A number of persons purchased stock in the franchises and
discovered that the stock was worthless. 78 The purchasers commenced an
action against American in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. 79 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated
sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the Securities Act by failing to register the stock
sold to the plaintiffs and by making material misstatements about the value
of the stock. 0 The district court in Hill York entered judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs and granted the plaintiffs damages.8' The defendants appealed
the decision of the district court to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.
2
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the defendants argued that the defendants
were not liable to the plaintiffs under section 12 because the defendants
were not the sellers of the securities. 3 To determine whether the defendants
qualified as section 12 sellers, the Hill York court adopted the proximate
cause test described by the district court in Lennerth. 4 The Hill York court
found that because the defendants were the motivating force behind the
enterprise, trained the local representatives, provided the sales brochures,
the defendants proximately caused the sales transaction.85 The Hill York
court, therefore, held the defendants liable as sellers under section 12 of
the Securities Act because the defendants were the proximate cause of the
sale of securities to the plaintiffs.8 6 The Hill York court's decision to adopt
77. Id. The promotional literature shown to the purchasers in Hill York falsely stated
that one of the defendants was an experienced capitalization consultant. Id. The local
representatives provided purchasers with glowing reports about the success of other sales centers
but failed to mention that other centers were under investigation by the SEC. Id.
78. Id. Basically, all the purchasers in Hill York bought shares in the regional sales
centers. Id. However, the money to support the sales centers supposedly came from the
restaurants franchises. Id. Because only one restaurant opened and operated only for a brief
period, the shares in the sales centers were worthless. Id. at 684.
79. Id. at 685.
80. Id. In Hill York the plaintiffs brought suit against the defendant under § 12 of the
Securities Act for return of the money that the defendants paid for the stock plus interest.
Id.
81. Id. at 685-686. The jury awarded to all but two of the plaintiffs return of the
purchase price that the plaintiffs paid for stock in the sales centers. Id. The jury also assessed
punitive damages against American and the two defendants. Id. at 686.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 692. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit the defendants in Hill York also argued
that the securities in question were exempt from the registration requirement. Id. at 686.
84. Id. at 693. In considering which test to apply in Hill York, the Fifth Circuit rejected
the strict privity test as too narrow and accepted the broader proximate cause test as set forth
in Lennerth. Id. at 692.
85. Id. at 693. In Hill York, the Fifth Circuit stated that a court could find with
certainty that the defendant's promotional sales ideas persauded the plaintiffs to purchase
American stock. Id.
86. Id. Although the Hill York court held that the defendants were liable for damages
under § 12(1) of the Securities Act, the Hill York court stated that § 12 did not allow a
plaintiff to recover punitive damages. Id. at 698. The Hill York court, therefore, reversed the
district court's grant of punitive damages to the plaintiffs. Id. at 697.
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the proximate cause test set forth by the Lennerth court marked the first
time that a federal court of appeals adopted tort law principles to determine
section 12 liability.
8 7
Two years after the Fifth Circuit decided Hill York, the Fifth Circuit
in Lewis v. Walston & Co.8 8 revised the meaning of the term seller under
section 12.89 In Lewis the defendant stock broker telephoned Lewis to
discuss the advantages of buying common stock in Allied Automation, Inc.
(Allied).90 Lewis accepted the advice of the broker and purchased stock in
Allied. 91 Allied never registered the common stock pursuant to the registra-
tion requirement of section 5 of the Securities Act. 92 Soon after Lewis
purchased the securities, Allied went into receivership and Lewis' stock
became worthless. 93 Lewis commenced an action against the broker in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 94 Lewis
alleged that the broker violated section 12(1) of the Securities Act by selling
to Lewis unregistered shares in Allied. 95 The jury in Lewis returned a verdict
against the broker. 96 Lewis appealed the district court verdict to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
97
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the broker argued that the jury lacked
a substantial basis for concluding that the broker was the proximate cause
of the sale to Lewis.98 The broker further argued that because the broker
did not proximately cause Lewis to purchase the securities, the broker did
87. See Note, supra note 22, at 372 (stating that Hill York was first time any federal
circuit court of appeals specifically adopted the proximate cause test for determining § 12
seller liability).
88. 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).
89. See Lewis v. Walston & Co., Inc., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973) (revising meaning
of term seller by requiring higher standard of proof; substantial factor test).
90. Lewis, 487 F.2d at 619. In Lewis the broker called Lewis many times to discuss
investment opportunities. Id. The broker serviced Lewis' securities trading account for ap-
proximately one year. Id. The broker made very optimistic statements about the prospect of
appreciation of the value of the Allied Automation (Allied) stock because Allied was developing
a money changing machine. Id. The broker compared Allied to IBM. Id.
91. Id. In Lewis Lewis purchased $50,000 worth of Allied stock. Id. Another plaintiff
in the suit, Mcdonald, purchased $20,000 worth of Allied stock from the broker. Id.
92. Id. at 621.
93. Id. at 619.
94. Id. at 618. In Lewis Lewis also commenced an action against the brokerage house.
Id.
95. Id. In addition to alleging that the broker in Lewis violated § 12(1) & (2) of the
Securities Act, Lewis alleged that the broker violated § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Id. The trial judge directed verdicts on the § 10b claim in favor of the broker. Id. Lewis
did not appeal the directed verdict to the Fifth Circuit. Id.
96. Id. at 619. In Lewis the jury awarded the plaintiffs $70,000, which was the equivalent
of the purchase price paid by the plaintiffs for the Allied stock. Id. After the jury returned a
verdict against both the broker and the brokerage firm, however, the judge granted a judgment
not withstanding the verdict to the brokerage firm and denied judgment not withstanding the
verdict to the broker. Id.
97. Id. at 617.
98. Id. at 622.
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not qualify as a seller under section 12. 99 The Lewis court noted that the
appropriate test for determining whether a person constitutes a section 12
seller is whether the person was the proximate cause of the sale.' ° The
Lewis court noted that the broker telephoned and persuaded the plaintiffs
to purchase the securities.' 0' The Lewis court reasoned that the jury in Lewis
permissibly could infer that the broker's actions were a substantial factor
in causing the purchase and, therefore, that the broker was the proximate
cause of the transaction. 0 2 Consequently, the Lewis court concluded that
because the broker was a substantial factor in bringing about the sale of
Allied securities, the broker was liable as a section 12 seller. 03 Accordingly,
the Lewis court affirmed the district court holding of liability on the part
of the broker.' 4
Although the Lewis court replaced the proximate cause test with the
substantial factor test, the Lewis court provided no explanation or guidance
for future courts to look to when applying the substantial factor test. 05 In
an attempt to clarify the substantial factor test, the Fifth Circuit in Pharo
v. Smith'01 revisited section 12 liability. 07 In Pharo the plaintiff, Pharo,
purchased common stock in Smith's Pride Foods (Smith's Pride) on the
recommendation of Wright, Smith's Pride's vice president for sales. 08
Wright informed Pharo that Smith's Pride planned to make a public offering
and that Pharo could resell the securities after the public offering at a
sizable profit.' 9 While Smith's Pride was considering a public offering of
99. Id.
100. Id. In deciding which test to use to determine a § 12 seller, the Lewis court rejected
the privity test and adopted the proximate cause test. Id. at 621. The Lewis court also noted
that courts traditionally hold brokers liable as § 12 sellers. Id.
101. Id. at 622. The Fifth Circuit in Lewis noted that the broker called Lewis to advise
Lewis to buy Allied stock. Id. The Lewis court also noted that the broker arranged a meeting
with Lewis to discuss investing in Allied stock. Id. Additionally, the Lewis court noted that
the defendant notified Lewis when the defendant located Allied stock for Lewis to purchase.
Id.
102. Id. The Lewis court noted that although Lewis was an interested party, the jury
found Lewis' testimony that he relied on the representations of the broker reliable. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. In deciding Lewis the Fifth Circuit did not provided an detailed analysis of the
substantial factor test. Id. Instead the Fifth Circuit merely stated any person who is a substantial
factor in bringing about a buyer's purchase of securities is a seller of securities. Id.
105. See Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980) (noted that Lewis statement
of substantial factor test is fact specific because court failed to clarify the substantial factor
language).
106. 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980).
107. Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980).
108. Pharo, 621 F.2d at 660.
109. Id. In Pharo the plaintiffs purchased Smith's Pride stock over an eight month period
from mid-September 1968 to April 1969. Id. at 659. W.L. Smith and A.J. Smith incorporated
Smith's Pride in February 1968 and the financial outlook for the company was encouraging.
Id. at 659. Within six months after incorporation Smith's Pride considered going public and
discussed the possibility of going public with an underwriter. Id. The underwriter agreed that
Smith's Pride possessed great potential but concluded that Smith's Pride was too young and
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stock, the Deltec Corporation (Deltec), Smith's Pride's beef supplier, sued
A.J. Smith and W.L. Smith the principle shareholders in Smith's Pride for
the balance of credit that Deltec had extended to the Smiths prior to the
Smiths incorporation of Smith's Pride. 10 The Smiths settled with Deltec out
of court.' The settlement agreement provided that the Smiths would
transfer 100,000 shares of Smith's Pride stock to Deltec and thereafter
would repurchase the shares from Deltec over a period of twelve months."
2
Soon after the settlement a federal audit resulted in a substantial claim for
back taxes, therefore, Smith's Pride never made the public offering and
never registered the securities with the SEC."' Because Smith Pride never
made a public offering Pharo never realized a sizeable profit from the
stock." 4 Pharo, therefore, commenced an action against both Smith and
Deltec in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama." 5 Pharo alleged that the Smiths and Deltec violated section 12(1)
of the Securities Act because the defendants sold the Smith's Pride stock
unproven to go forward with the public offering. Id. However, the underwriter advised Smith's
Pride to reincorporate under Delaware law and to hire a nationally certified public accounting
firm in anticipation of a public offering. Id. The underwriter also promised to reevaluate
Smith's Pride in nine months. Id. Smith's Pride reincorporated in Delaware and hired a
nationally certified public accounting firm. Id. W.L Smith and A.J Smith, the founders of
Smith's Pride, owned approximately one million shares which was the equivalent of 90% of
the Smith's Pride stock. Id. To allow a few purchasers to benefit from the future public
offering, the Smiths sold some shares of Smith's Pride stock at approximately five dollars per
share. Id. The Smiths informed the purchasers that Smith's Pride's intended to make a public
offering of Smith's Pride securities. Id.
110. Id. at 662. In Pharo Smith's Pride's beef supplier was the Deltec Corporation
(Deltec), one of the largest foreign beef packing corporations in the United States. Id. When
A.J. Smith and W.L. Smith incorporated Smith's Pride, A.J. Smith and W.L. Smith accepted
Smith's Pride common stock in exchange for $212,000 worth of foreign beef that the Smiths
purchased from Deltec. Id. Deltec claimed that the Smith's owed Deltec $493,000 prior to the
formation of Smith's Pride. Id. The Smiths denied owing Deltec $493,000 and Deltec initiated
a suit against the Smiths. Id. On October 3 , 1968, after the swearing in the jury, Deltec and
the Smith's settled. Id. The settlement required the Smith's to transfer to Deltec 100,000 shares
of the Smith's stock in Smith's Pride. Id. The settlement contract required the Smith's to
repurchase the shares transferred to Deltec for five dollars per share. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. In Pharo the Smith's settled with Deltec because the Smith's believed that pending
litigation with Deltec would reduce the chances of a public offering of Smith's Pride stock.
Id. The settlement agreement precluded Deltec from selling the shares to anyone but the Smiths
unless the shares were registered pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Act. Id. Deltec
retained the right to cancel the buy back agreement at any time and keep the shares
unencumbered by the Smiths. Id. The settlement agreement stated, however, the Smith's Pride
shares were subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act. Id.
113. Id. at 661. In Pharo after a federal tax audit of Smith's Pride, the federal government
concluded that Smith's Pride owed the Government two million dollars. Id. In addition to the
federal tax audit, a downturn in the over-the-counter market in 1969 vastly reduced Smith's
Pride's chances of offering stock to the public. Id.
114. Id. In Pharo W.L. Smith offered to buy back all the plaintiffs shares for five dollars
per share but the plaintiffs rejected the offer. Id.
115. Id. at 659.
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in violation of the registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities
Act." 6 The Smiths and Deltec moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that the Smiths and Deltec did not qualify as sellers under section 12."
7
The district court granted Deltec's motion for summary judgment and denied
Smiths' motion for summary judgment without making any findings of fact
or any conclusions of law."1 Pharo appealed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Deltec to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. 1 9
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Pharo argued that Deltec qualified as
a section 12 seller because Deltec played a substantial factor in bringing
about the sale of securities to Pharo.120 Pharo argued that Deltec had a
motive to encourage sales of Smith's Pride stock to increase the value of
the Smith's Pride stock that Deltec held.' 2 ' Pharo claimed that Deltec
especially encouraged the sales of the Smiths' stock because the sale of the
Smiths' stock could provide the funds necessary to repay Deltec.'2 Pharo
claimed that Deltec encouraged the Smiths and Smith's Pride to sell as
much stock as possible and that Deltec's encouragement was a substantial
factor in the sale of stock to Pharo.'2 In considering Pharo's argument the
Fifth Circuit stated that the proper test for evaluating whether a person
constitutes a section 12 seller is a combination of the tests outlined in Hill
York and Lewis.2' The Pharo court noted that the Hill York court set
forth a proximate cause test'2 while the Lewis court declared that an
individual is the proximate cause of a sale if the individual is a substantial
factor in causing the sale to occur. 2 6 The Pharo court noted that the Lewis
116. Id. The plaintiffs in Pharo commenced an action against Smith's Pride under § 12(1)
of the Securities Act on May 4, 1971. Id. On February 1, 1972, before the parties could settle
or adjudicate the § 12(1) action, general creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition
against Smith's Pride. Id. at 661. On March 9, 1972 a bankruptcy court adjudicated Smith's
Pride as bankrupt. Id. On May 5, 1972, the district court granted plaintiffs leave to amend
the complaint to include Deltec as a defendant. Id.
117. Id. at 663. In Pharo the plaintiff, Pharo, alleged that Deltec violated §§ 12(2) and
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. Pharo further alleged that Deltec violated § 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 the anti-fraud provision of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Id. See supra
note 55 (discussing § 10b of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
118. Pharo, 621 F.2d at 663.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 667-668. In Pharo Pharo claimed that Deltec was looking for satisfaction of
the debt owed to Deltec by the Smiths. Id. Pharo inferred from the fact that Deltec had an
option to retain all the shares and seek satisfaction of the debt by selling the shares that Deltec
wanted to increase the demand for Smith's Pride shares. Id.
121. Id. at 667.
122. Id.
123. Id. The Fifth Circuit in Pharo concluded that Deltec contemplated that Smith's Pride
would complete the public offering and thus increase the value of the Smith's Pride stock held
by Deltec. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing proximate cause test adopted
by Fifth Circuit in Hill York).
126. Pharo, 621 F.2d at 667. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing
substantial factor analysis applied by Fifth Circuit in Lewis).
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court defined a substantial factor as more than mere participation in the
events that lead up to a sale of securities. 27 The Pharo court also noted,
however, that other than the statement that the mere participation is not
enough to constitute a substantial factor, the only guide to interpreting a
substantial factor are the factual situations presented in Lewis and Hill
York.128 The Pharo court decided that an individual is a substantial factor
in the sale of securities if the individual's participation in a purchase of
securities is a substantial factor in causing the transaction to occur.
29
Turning to the facts in Pharo the Fifth Circuit concluded that Deltec was
not a substantial factor in the sale of securities to Pharo because Deltec
possessed no knowledge of the purchase agreement between Smith's Pride
and Pharo. I30 The Pharo court, therefore, held that Deltec did not qualify
as a seller of Smith's Pride securities and that Deltec was not liable under
section 12.131
After the Fifth Circuit adopted the substantial factor test in Pharo, the
Circuit Courts of Appeal for the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit, and adopted the substantial factor
test to determine when an individual qualifies as a seller under section 12.132
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Pharo, 621 F.2d at 667. Although the Pharo court stated that the substantial factor
test is the appropriate test for determining § 12 seller status in the Fifth Circuit, the Pharo
court acknowledged that the substantial factor test is difficult to articulate and very fact
specific. Id.
130. Id. The Pharo court noted that Pharo produced no evidence at trial demonstrating
that Deltec had any knowledge of the fact that the Smiths were selling stock to anyone. Id.
The Pharo court further noted that the settlement agreement between Deltec and the Smiths
prohibited the Smiths from selling the repurchased shares without registering the stock under
the Securities Act. Id. Therefore, the Pharo court reasoned that Deltec was probably unaware
of the sale of Smith's Pride stock to Pharo. Id. Because Deltec was unaware of the stock
sales, the Pharo court concluded that Deltec was not a substantial factor in causing the sales
to occur. Id. at 668.
131. Id.
132. See Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 1986); Davis v.
Avco Fin. Serv., Inc, 739 F.2d 1057, 1066 (6th Cir. 1984); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779,
785 (8th Cir. 1981). In Adalman, Baker, Watts & Co. (Baker), an investment banking
partnership in Maryland, purchased one third of the stock of Superior Petroleum, Inc.
Adalman, 807 F.2d at 361. Baker used the one third interest in Superior Petroleum for a
private offering of limited partnership interests as tax shelters. Id. Baker then solicited buyers
for the tax shelters. Id. at 362. Baker also employed two securities dealers to assist in the
private offering. Id. Baker instructed the two securities dealers to use only the prospectus
supplied by Baker. Id. Adalman and nineteen other investors purchased $1,702,500 worth of
interests in the limited partnership. Id. Unfortunately for the purchasers of the partnership
interest, the partnership went into receivership in 1982 and Clinton Oil Corporation managed
the operation of the partnership. Id. In April 1983 Adalman and the other investors commenced
an action against Baker and the two securities dealers under § 12 of the Securities Act in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Id. The district court held that
Baker qualified as a § 12 seller and held Baker liable under § 12. Id. Baker appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit asserting that the district court erred
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The Second, Third and Ninth Circuits, however, rejected the substantial
by deciding as a matter of law that Baker qualified as a § 12 seller. Id.
The Fourth Circuit in Adalman stated that persons who are a substantial factor in causing
a sale of securities qualify as § 12 sellers. Id. at 363. The Adalman court further stated that
the substantial factor test excludes persons who execute an unsolicited order or have no causal
connection in the transaction. Id. at 364. The Adalman court noted that Baker solicited offers
to buy the securities and controlled the solicitations of the two securities brokers employed to
solicit offers. Id. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Baker was a § 12 seller and
affirmed the decision of the district court. Id. By narrowing the substantial factor test to only
those persons soliciting an order to buy or participating in a more significant manner, the
Fourth Circuit narrowed the definition of seller from the definition provided by the Fifth
Circuit in Pharo. Id.
Like the Fourth Circuit in Adalman the Sixth Circuit adopted the substantial factor test.
Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1066 (6th Cir. 1984). In Davis the manager of
Avco, a finance company, convinced Davis and other investors to purchase shares in a pyramid
scheme called "Dare to be Great"(DTBG). Davis, 739 F.2d at 1059. A manager of Avco
convinced the plaintiffs that DTBG was a sound investment. Id. The manager also convinced
the plaintiffs to finance the purchase by taking a loan from Avco. Id. at 1061. The plaintiffs
purchased shares in DTBG financed by Avco loans. Id. As with all pyramid schemes, the
venture eventually failed and the shares became worthless. Id. Davis commenced a suit against
Avco in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Id. The plaintiffs
alleged that Avco and the Manager violated § 12(2) of the Securities Act. Id. The district
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and the defendant appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Id. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit in Davis concluded that the
appropriate test for determining § 12 seller status was the substantial factor test. Id. at 1066.
The court reasoned that without the assistance of Avco the plaintiffs would not have purchased
the DTBG securities. Id. The Davis court reasoned that because Avco's loans were necessary
for the plaintiffs to purchase the shares of DTBG, the manger and Avco were a substantial
factor in causing the sales to occur. Id. The Davis court, therefore, held that Avco qualified
as a § 12(2) seller. Id.at 1063.
In addition to the Fourth and Sixth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit adopted the substantial
factor test. Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981). In Stokes Stokes purchased
gold and silver in bulk from Continental Financial Corporation (CFC) on margin accounts.
Stoke ,644 F.2d at 785. Prior to the purchases in question, CFC hired Touche, Ross & Co.,
certified public accountants, to audit CFC's accounts. Id. Touche, Ross requested that Lokken's
law firm examine CFC's bulk sales of coins on margin accounts to determine if the sales
qualified as securities. Id. Lokken advised CFC that the bulk sales of coins did not constitute
sale of securities. Id. Stokes commenced a suit against CFC in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Minnesota. Id. Stokes alleged that CFC sold securities without
benefit of registration as required by the Securities Act. Id. CFC encountered financial
difficulties and eventually filed a petition in bankruptcy. Id. at 781. After termination of the
bankruptcy proceedings, the district court allowed Stokes to amend the complaint to include
Lokken. Id. The district court granted summary judgment for Lokken and Stokes appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Id.
On appeal Stokes argued that Lokken qualified as a § 12 seller and that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment to Lokken. Id. at 781-82. The Stokes court concluded
that the appropriate test for determining § 12 seller status is whether privity existed between
the buyer and seller or the seller was a substantial factor in causing the sales transaction to
occur. Id. at 785. The Stokes court noted that Lokken was not in privity with Stokes and
that Lokken's only relation to the sales transaction was a letter responding to the request for
legal advice by Touche, Ross. Id. The Stokes court reasoned that Lokken's involvement in
the transaction was too remote to qualify as a substantial factor. Id. Therefore, the Stokes
court held that Lokken did not qualify as a § 12 seller and affirmed the district court grant
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factor test and developed alternative tests to define seller's under section
12.11' For example, under the Second Circuit test, a person was a section
12 seller if privity existed between the person and the individuals that
purchased securites from the person.'34 Without privity, the Second Circuit
imposes an element of intent on the seller by requiring proof that the seller
had knowledge of a material misstatement or had knowledge that the security
is illegally unregistered at the time the plaintiff purchased the securities . 35
The Third Circuit, however, held that two types of persons constituted
sellers under section 12: an owner of securities who passes title to the
securities to a buyer and any person who sells securities to a purchaser
while under the control of the owner of the securities.136 Finally, the Ninth
of summary judgment in favor of Lokken. Id.
The substantial factor test adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Pharo is binding on the Eleventh
Circuit due to the division of the Fifth Circuit into the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit
in 1981. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, PuB. L. No. 96-452,
94 Stat. 1994. See Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Sec. Co., 759 F.2d 838, 843 & n.14 (11th Cir.
1985) (stating that previous Fifth Circuit § 12 opinions decided before 1981 are binding in
Eleventh Circuit).
133. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (discussing tests adopted by Second,
Third & Ninth Circuits in place of substantial factor test).
134. See Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 803 F.2d 749, 756 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that
privity or scienter is necessary to prove § 12 seller liability).
135. See Akerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc., 810 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir. 1987). In
Akerman the Second Circuit required proof of the seller's scienter in the absence of privity.
Akerman, 810 F.2d at 344. In Akerman Akerman bought Oryx securities from an underwriter
for $4.75 per share after Oryx registered the securities with the SEC. Id. at 338. Oryx made
a material misstatement in the prospectus filed with the SEC overstating net earnings and
earnings per share. Id. Oryx revealed the mistake to the SEC and the price of shares eventually
dropped to $3.50 per share. Id. Because of the decline in share price, Akerman commenced
an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Id.
Akerman alleged that Oryx violated § 12(2) by making a material misstatement of fact in
Oryx's prospectus. Id. Oryx motioned for summary judgment arguing that the misstatements
were not material and that Akerman was not in privity with Oryx because Oryx bought the
securities from the underwriter not from Oryx. Id. The district court granted Oryx's motion
stating that Akerman lacked privity with Oryx because Akerman purchased the securities from
the underwriters. Id. at 339. Akerman appealed the decision of the district court to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id.
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Akerman argued that privity is not required to establish
Oryx as a seller under § 12 of the Securities Act. Id. at 344. The Akerman court stated that
a successful § 12(2) claim requires a showing of privity between the plaintiff and defendant
or in the absence of privity proof of scienter on the part of the seller. Id. As proof of scienter
the Akerman court required knowing misconduct on the part of the seller. Id. The Akerman
court noted that Akerman failed to make a showing that Oryx possessed the requisite knowledge
concerning the material misstatement in the registration materials to constitute scienter on the
part of Oryx. Id. The Akerman court, therefore, held that the grant of summary judgment
of the district court was appropriate. Id.
136. See Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1979). In Collins the Third
Circuit set forth the privity based test of seller liability. Collins, 605 F.2d at 113. In Collins
Collins purchased stock in the Signetics Corporation (Signetics) from Signetics' underwriter
Lehman Brothers Company for seventeen dollars a share. Id. at 12. Shortly after Collins
purchased Signetics stock, the United States Phillips Corporation (Phillips) merged with
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Circuit held that a person qualified as a section 12 seller if the person's
actions were not only a substantial factor in a sale of securities but also a
necessary factor in the sale of the securities.
3 7
Signetics. Id. Phillips required Collins to surrender Collins' shares for eight dollars a share.
Id. Collins commenced an action against Signetics in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. Collins alleged that Signetics violated § 12(2) of the
Securities Act because the majority shareholder of Signetics intended to sell his shares in
Signetics for along time before Collins purchased stock in Signetics but Signetics never informed
Collins of the planned sale. Id. at 112-113. The district court construed § 12 to require some
form of privity between a seller and a purchaser in the absence of a special relationship such
as control of the seller by the issuer before the court would hold a defendant liable as a § 12
seller. Id. at 112. The district court found that although privity existed between Collins and
the underwriter, privity did not exist between Collins and Signetics. Id. The district court
concluded that Signetics did not qualify as a § 12 seller and dismissed Collins' claims. Id.
Collins appealed the district court decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. Id. at 113.
On appeal the Collins court agreed with the district court that § 12 requires privity
between the seller and buyer in the absence of a controlling relationship. Id. at 112. The
Collins court reasoned that the language of § 12 required privity because § 12 only allows the
purchaser to bring a claim against the purchaser's immediate seller. Id. at 113. Adding to the
analysis of the language, the Collins court noted that any broader interpretation of § 12 would
torture the plain meaning of the language. Id. The Collins court reasoned that Collins did not
have a § 12 claim against Signetics because the transfer of title to the securities was between
the underwriter and Collins. Id. at 114. The Collins court also found that Signetics was not
in a special relationship with the underwriter because Signetics did not control the selling
practices of the underwriter. Id. at 113. The Collins court, therefore, held that Collins had
no claim under § 12 against Signetics because Signetics did not constitute a seller under § 12
of the Securities Act. Id. at 114.
137. Anderson v. Aurotek, 774 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1985). In Anderson the Ninth
Circuit applied a test requiring that a seller's actions be necessary to and a substantial factor
in the sales transaction. Anderson, 774 F.2d at 930. In Anderson the defendants formed a
joint venture to exploit a mining claim in Idaho. Id. at 929. To exploit the mining claim, the
defendants formed the Aurotek Corporation and sold fractional interests in the mining claim.
Id. The defendants never registered the fractional interests with the SEC. Id. The defendants
hired a retailer of tax shelters to sell the securities and Anderson purchased interests in the
mining claim from the retailer. Id. When the mine failed to produce gold, Anderson commenced
an action against the defendants under § 12 in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington. Id. The district court held that the defendants violated § 12 and
granted summary judgment against the defendants. Id. The defendants appealed to the United
States District Court for the Ninth Circuit. Id.
On appeal the defendants argued that the defendants failed to qualify as sellers of the
fractional interests because the defendants did not offer or sell the securities to Anderson. Id.
In reviewing the defendants claim, the Ninth Circuit directly quoted an earlier Ninth Circuit
decision that required a showing of necessary and substantial involvement in a sales transaction
by a defendant to qualify the defendant as a seller under § 12. Id. The Ninth circuit further
stated that the terms substantial and necessary involvement included a showing that the
defendant's actions were the "but for" cause of the sale and that the defendant's involvement
was more that incidental. See id. at 930 (quoting SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 649-650 (9th
Cir. 1980). The Anderson court found that the defendants actions were not necessary to and
a substantial factor in the sales transaction because the defendants left the solicitation of offers
to buy the interests and the closing of sales of the interests to the tax shelter retailer. Id. at
930. Accordingly, the Anderson court held that the defendants were not sellers of the securities
and reversed the district court grant of summary judgment in favor of Anderson. Id.
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Because the circuit courts employed four different tests to determine
which individuals constitute a seller under section 12, the circuit courts
produced conflicting results. 3 In addition to the conflict among the federal
circuit courts, the tests lacked clarity. 3 9 As a result of the lack of clarity,
securities professionals increasingly were unable to predict the level of
involvement in a securities transaction that qualified a participant as a
section 12 seller. 4
As a result of conflict between the federal courts of appeal, and the
lack of clarity surrounding the substantial factor test, the United States
Supreme Court in Pinter v. DahP4' addressed the question of who constitutes
a seller under section 12.142 Pinter was an oil and gas producer in Texas
and Oklahoma. 43 Dahl was a California real estate broker and investor
pursuing oil and gas ventures.44 Dahl advanced Pinter $20,000 to locate oil
and gas leases with the understanding that if Pinter located any viable
leases, Pinter would hold the leases in the name of Pinter's Black Gold Oil
Company. 45 Pinter located some oil and gas leases in Oklahoma and Dahl
invested approximately $310,000 in the leases.'" Believing that the leases
were a sound investment, Dahl advised friends, family and business asso-
ciates to buy the leases and assisted the investors in purchasing the leases. 147
Dahl did not receive a commission for convincing the other investors to
invest in the leases. 48 Although section 5 of the Securities Act required
Pinter to register the leases before selling the leases to Dahl and the other
138. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text (discussing various test applied by
various circuits and results of various test).
139. See Comment, Attorneys Beware: Increased Liability for Providing Advice to Cor-
porate Clients Issuing Securities, 20 AICRoN L. Rv. 525-527 (1987) (discussing lack of specificity
of various tests that courts use to determine § 12 seller status).
140. See id. (discussing increasing § 12 liability for securities professionals due to changing
definitions of § 12 seller); Rapp, Expanded Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act:
When Is A Seller Not A Seller?, 27 CAsE W. REs. L. Rv. 445 (1977) (discussing varying tests
of § 12 liability since enactment of Securities Act).
141. 108 S.Ct. 2063 (1988).
142. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2067 (1988).
143. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2063. In Pinter Pinter formed several corporations to effectuate
Pinter's production of oil and gas. Id. The companies were Black Gold Oil Company, Pinter
Energy Company, and Pinter Oil Company. Id. at n.1.
144. Id. at 2067.
145. Id. In Pinter Dahl advanced $20,000 to Pinter to locate the oil and gas leases with
the understanding that Dahl would have the right of first refusal to drill wells on leased
properties. Id.
146. Id. In Pinter Dahl toured property that Pinter located and discussed the possibilities
of discovering oil on the property with Dahl. Id. Dahl also examined the geology, drilling
logs, and production histories of the property and concluded that the leases were a sound
investment. Id.
147. Id. In Pinter Dahl convinced his brother, his accountant, his partner in a construction
business, the bank officer handling his construction loans, his construction-business insurance
agent, and several friends to purchase Pinter's leases. Id. at n.2.
148. Id. at 2068.
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investors, Pinter never complied with section 5. 14 Eventually the oil venture
failed and the leases proved worthless. 50 Dahl and the other investors
commenced an action against Pinter in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas.15 1 Dahl claimed that Pinter violated section
12(1) of the Securities Act because Pinter sold the leases without registering
the leases as section 5 of the Securities Act required. 5 2 After the district
court entered judgment against Pinter, Pinter appealed the decision of the
district court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
53
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Pinter claimed that Dahl committed
fraud by inducing Pinter to sell the leases in violation of the registration
requirements of the Securities Act.'-4 The Fifth Circuit rejected Pinter's
claim of fraud and affirmed the district court's judgment against Pinter.'
The Fifth Circuit next considered whether Dahl qualified as a seller under
section 12 because the Fifth Circuit assumed that if Dahl qualified as a
seller under section 12, Dahl's activities entitled Pinter to recover contri-
bution from Dahl. s6 The Fifth Circuit applied a modified version of the
substantial factor test.5 7 The Fifth Circuit stated that a person qualifies as
a section 12 seller if the person either transfers title to the securities in
exchange for consideration, or if the person's participation in the sale of
149. Id. In Pinter Pinter disclosed on the securities that the securities were not registered
with the SEC. Id. at 2067. Pinter stated on the face of the securities that the securities were
available to a limited number of sophisticated investors and, therefore, SEC Rule 146 exempted
the securities from the registration requirement of § 5 of the Securities Act. Id. at 2068. See
Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1982) (codifying exceptions to registration requirement of § 5).
Rule 146 prohibited general advertising of the securities offering and only allowed the sale of
securities to sophisticated buyers who had access to the same kind of information contained
in a registration statement. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1982). SEC Rule 146 has been superceded
by Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 425 (1988).
150. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2068.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2068. In addition to claiming in Pinter that Pinter violated § 12(1) of the
Securities act, Dahl also claimed that Pinter violated § 12(2) of the Securities Act because
Pinter made material misrepresentations about the oil and gas leases and Pinter's experience
in the oil and gas industry. Id. at 2068 n.4. Pinter counterclaimed that Dahl, by means of
fraudulent misrepresentation, induced Pinter to sell the securities without benefit of registration.
Id. In addition to claiming that Dahl induced Pinter to sell the oil and gas leases by fraud,
Pinter also claimed that the oil and gas interest were exempt from registration and, therefore,
§ 12 did not apply to the sales transaction. Id. at 2069. Pinter alleged that Dahl promised
Pinter that only qualified, sophisticated and knowledgeable buyers would purchase the secu-
rities. Id. at 2068.
153. Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985, 987 (5th Cir. 1986).
154. Id. -
155. Id. at 991.
156. Id. at 990. The Fifth Circuit, in Pinter considered whether Dahl qualified as a seller
of the securities even though none of the other investors brought a § 12 claim against Dahl.
Id. The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether Dahl was a § 12 seller because Pinter
made the § 12 seller claim on appeal. Id.
157. Id. In deciding Pinter, the Fifth Circuit applied a modified substantial factor test.
Id. The Fifth Circuit modified the substantial factor test by adding a financial motivation
requirement to the traditional substantial factor test. Id.
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the securities is a substantial factor in causing the sale to occur. 58 The Fifth
Circuit also conditioned the determination of whether an individual qualifies
as a section 12 seller on the requirement that the person must be motivated
by a desire to benefit someone other than the person purchasing the
securities.'3 9 After examining the facts in Pinter the First Circuit reasoned
that because Dahl neither sought nor received any form of commission in
return for advising the investors to buy the securities, Dahl was motivated
only by a desire to help other investors160 The Fifth Circuit concluded,
therefore, that Dahl was not a seller for purposes of section 12 and that
Dahl did not owe any contribution to Pinter.' 6' Pinter appealed the Fifth
Circuit's decision to the United States Supreme Court. 62
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pinter because of the impor-
tance of the issue of section 12 liability in the administration of federal
securities law. 63 In considering Pinter the Supreme Court first noted that
the Securities Act does not define the term "seller" and that the legislative
history of the Securities Act provides little assistance in defining the term
"seller".' 64 The Pinter Court found that, at the very least, the language of
section 12 requires that an individual who transfers title of securities to
another for value must qualify as a section 12 seller. 6s The Court further
noted, however, that section 2(3) of the Securities Act defines the terms
"sale" and "sell" to include every attempt or offer to dispose of securities
and every solicitation of an offer to buy securities. 1' The Pinter Court
reasoned that the language of section 2(3) broadens the range of persons
potentially liable under section 12 beyond those persons who simply transfer
title to the securities to another for value. 67 The Court found that the
inclusion of the phrase "solicitation of an offer to buy" in the definition
of the phrase "offer to sell" is expansive enough to encompass the entire
selling process. 68
158. Id.
159. Id. at 991. In deciding which persons constitute § 12 sellers the Fifth Circuit, in
Pinter, reasoned that imposing liability on an individual for giving gratuitous advice to friends
and family unnecessarily interferes with patterns of social discourse. Id. The Fifth Circuit,
therefore, added the requirement that a § 12 seller act out of motivation for himself or the
owner of the securities. Id.
160. Id. at 992. The dissent in Pinter argued that Pinter was motivated by a desire to
help himself. Id. at n.3. The dissent maintained that by increasing the number of investors,
Dahl increased the amount of capital and decreased the amount of risk per investor. Id. By
increasing capital in the venture and decreasing the risk, the dissent noted that Pinter benefitted
financially. Id.
161. Id. at 990. The Fifth Circuit, in Pinter, acknowledged that Dahl was a substantial
factor in causing the sale of the securities to the other investors. Id.
162. Pinter v. Dahl, 481 U.S. 1012 (1987).
163. Id. at 2070.
164. Id. at 2076. The Pinter court stated that the statutory construction of the Securities
Act must begin with the plain language of the Securities Act. Id.
165. ld.
166. Id. at 2076. See supra note 6 (setting forth § 2(3) of Securities Act).
167. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2076.
168. Id. The Pinter court reasoned that solicitation of an offer to buy is not an activity
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The Pinter Court stated, however, that not everyone involved in the
selling process should qualify as a section 12 seller. 69 The Court stated that
section 12 only imposes liability on persons from whom a buyer ptirchased
securities.7 0 Balancing the definition of the term "sale" and the requirement
that a buyer must purchase from a section 12 seller, the Pinter Court
promulgated a new test for determining whether a person qualifies as a
section 12 seller.' 7' To qualify as a section 12 seller under the Pinter test,
a person must either transfer the title of securities to a purchaser or
successfully solicit an offer to buy securities from the purchaser. 72 The
Pinter test also requires that a person who solicits the sale of the securities
must be motivated by a desire to provide financial benefit to himself or to
the owner of the securities, 73
confined to the actual owner of the securities. Id. See supra note 6 (setting forth § 2(3)
definition of "offer to sell").
169. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2077. Although the Pinter Court expanded the definition of
seller beyond persons in privity with the buyer, the Pinter Court acknowledged that liability
attaches only to the immediate purchaser of the security from the seller. Id. at n.21, Therefore,
liability attaches only to the buyer's immediate seller. Id.
170, Id. at 2077, The Pinter Court noted that the Securities Act neglects to define the
term "purchase" but that the best construction of the term "purchase" is a correlative to the
terms "sell" and "offer". Id. The Pinter Court found that the term "purchase" requires an
individual to actively solicit an offer to buy securities. Id.
171. Id. at 2079, In deciding to promulgate a test for determining who constitutes a § 12
seller, the Supreme Court, in Pinter, acknowledged that most courts and commentators use
the same definition of a seller under § 12(1) or § 12(2) regardless of the fact that § 12(1) and
(2) apply to different situations. Id. at 2076 n.20. The Pinter Court relied on both § 12(1)
and (2) cases to develop the Pinter Court's definition of the term seller. Id. However, because
the decision in Pinter concerned § 12(1) of the Securities Act the Supreme Court declined to
take a position concerning the application of the Pinter definition of the term seller to claims
under § 12(2) of the Securities Act. Id.
172. Id. at 2079. In deciding Pinter, the Supreme Court reasoned that solicitation of an
offer to sell is important because solicitation is the point in the sale of securities in which the
investor is most likely to receive information about the security. Id. at 2078. The Pinter Court
reasoned that because Congress enacted the Securities Act to prevent injury to buyers of
securities and that solicitation is the stage when most investors receive information about the
stock, solicitation is very important to the definition of seller. Id.
173. Id, at 2079. The Pinter Court stated that a person does not qualify as a seller by
soliciting an offer to buy securities if the person simply gives gratuitous advice intended to
benefit another. Id. at 2078. Interestingly, the Pinter Court's reasoning closely parallels the
reasoning of the First Circuit's decision in Cady v. Murphy. Cady v, Murhpy, 113 F,2d 988,
990 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940). In Cady the First circuit construed the term
"seller" to include more than those persons who transfer title. to securities, Cady, 113 F.2d
at 990. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's reasoning in
Cady for expanding definition of term seller beyond persons transferring title to securities).
Like the Fifth Circuit in Cady, the Pinter court also interpreted § 12 to include more than
persons who transfer title to securities. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct 2063, 2076 (1988). In addition
to expanding the term seller beyond those individuals who pass title to the securities, the Cady
court construed § 12 to require a seller to solicit an offer to buy from the purchaser, Cady,
113 F.2d at 990. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Pinter interpreted § 12 to require a seller to
solicit an offer to buy securities from the purchaser. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2077. Additionally,
while the First Circuit in Cady expressly declined to decide whether the motivation of the
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In deciding Pinter, the Supreme Court determined that Dahl's activities
in contacting and assisting friends, family members, and business associates
in buying the oil and gas leases qualified as soliciting offers to buy the
securities. 74 The Court found the record unclear, however, on whether Dahl
solicited the offers to buy the leases because of a desire to benefit Pinter
or himself, or whether Dahl was motivated solely by a desire to benefit
Dahl's friends, family members, and business associates.175 The Pinter Court,
therefore, vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded the case to the
Fifth Circuit instructing the Fifth Circuit to determine Dahl's motivation
for soliciting offers to buy the leases.'
7 6
In deciding Pinter the Supreme Court expressly rejected the substantial
factor test. 77 The Pinter Court noted three reasons for rejecting the sub-
stantial factor test. 7 s First, the Pinter Court stated that the substantial
factor test divorces analysis of who constitutes a section 12 seller from the
applicable statutory scheme of the Securities Act. 79 Second, the Pinter
Court stated that the language of section 12 focuses on the relationship
between the seller and the purchaser while the substantial factor test incor-
rectly focuses on the defendant's degree of involvement in a securities
transaction. ' ° Third, the Pinter Court stated that the broad remedial goals
of the Securities Act do not support a test such as the substantial factor
test without some statutory language or legislative history supporting the
test.' 8' The Pinter Court concluded that a person is not liable as a section
person soliciting an offer to buy may disqualify that person as a § 12 seller, the dissent in
Cady argued that a person motivated solely by a desire to benefit the purchaser and not the
owner of the securities is not a § 12 seller. Cady, 113 F.2d at 991. The Pinter court similarly
stated that if a person solicits the purchase of securities motivated by a desire to benefit the
purchaser, the person does not qualify as a seller for § 12 purposes. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2079.
The similarities between the Supreme Court's decision in Pinter and the First Circuit's decision
in Cady stem from a philosophy of closely construing sections of the Securities Act according
to the language of the Act and the intent of the drafters. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2081-2082;
Cady, 113 F.2d at 990-991.
174. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2082.
175. Id. at 2083.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2082. The Supreme Court in Pinter expressly rejected the substantial factor
test but declined to comment on the definition of the term seller as adopted by other federal
circuit courts of appeal. Id.
178. Id. at 2079-2082.
179. Id. at 2080. The Pinter Court noted that when federal courts employ the substantial
factor test, the federal courts substitute tort concepts of proximate causation for the statutory
language of the terms "offer" or "sell" that Congress provided in § 2(3) of the Securities
Act. Id. at 2080-81.
180. Id. at 2081. In Pinter the Supreme Court stated that by focusing on a defendant's
relationship with the securities transaction and not the defendant's relationship with the
purchaser, courts extend liability to persons only remotely related to the relevant aspects of
the securities transaction. Id. The Pinter Court stated that the substantial factor test improperly
exposes securities professionals to liability under § 12 merely because the professional performs
duties that are necessary to the completion of the transaction. Id.
181. Id. at 2081-82. The Pinter Court stated that courts must construe the Securities Act
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12 seller simply because the person is a substantial factor in causing the
sale of securities.
82
The Pinter decision will affect many federal courts because the Pinter
decision rejects the substantial factor test and introduces a new test for
determining when individuals qualify as sellers under section 12.183 Under
the Pinter test an individual constitutes a seller for purposes of section 12
if the individual either transfers the title of securities to a purchaser or
successfully solicits an offer to buy securities.8 4 The Pinter test also requires
that an individual be motivated by a desire to benefit financially the
individual or the owner of the securities.
18 5
By replacing the substantial factor test with the Pinter test, the Pinter
Court narrowed the range of persons who qualify as sellers under section
12. 16 For instance, prior to the Pinter decision courts applying the substan-
tial factor test found that attorneys drafting securities agreements, 87 ac-
countants analyzing investments,8 and investment bankers assisting in
by evaluating both the statutory language and the legislative intent of Congress. Id. at 2082.
The Pinter Court noted that § 12 does not reveal any congressional intent to inject tort law
concepts such as reliance and causation into the elements of § 12 liability. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. By expressly overruling the Fifth Circuit's use of the substantial factor test in §
12(1) cases, the Pinter Court nullified the substantial factor tests of the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth
and Eleventh Circuits. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of
substantial factor test by Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits). Similarly, the Pinter
court rejected the Second Circuit's requirement of privity between a buyer and a seller. Pinter,
108 S.Ct. at 2076. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's
interpretation of § 12 as requiring privity between the seller and purchasers or proof of scienter
on the part of sellers). Additionally, the Third Circuit's requirement of privity between a buyer
and § 12 seller or a special relationship the owner and the owner's agent now conflicts with
the Pinter Court's decision to reject the privity test. See supra note 136 and accompanying
text (discussing Third Circuit's test for determining which persons constitute § 12 sellers).
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's test requiring that § 12 sellers must be a substantial factor in
completing a sale along with a necessary component of the sale now stands in conflict with
the Supreme Court's decision in Pinter. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2082. See supra note 137 and
accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's test for determining § 12 liability).
184. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2078.
185. Id. at 2079. See supra notes 172-174 and accompanying text (discussing Pinter test
for § 12(1) seller).
186. Id. at 2081. In rejecting the substantial factor test, the Pinter Court stated that the
substantial factor test was too expansive. Id. The Pinter Court stated that the substantial
factor test imposed liability on persons who were only remotely related to the sale of securities.
Id. The Pinter Court noted that the substantial factor test could result in the imposition of §
12 liability on lawyers and securities professionals who merely operated in a professional
capacity but did not solicit purchase of securities. Id.
187. See Koehler v. Pulvers, 1985-86 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,232 at 91,666 (S.D.Cal.
July 9, 1985) (holding attorney liable as § 12 seller for preparing loan brokerage agreement
that allowed sale of securities to go forward).
188. See Gold v. LTV Corp., 1984 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,654 at 99,307 (N.D.
Texas Aug. 24, 1984) (denying reconsideration of judgement against accountant because
accountant's evaluation of company's financial position could be a substantial factor inducing
sales of stock).
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securities transactions8 9 all qualified as section 12 sellers.' 9° After Pinter,
however, attorneys, accountants, and bankers are less likely to qualify as
sellers by merely performing professional services that do not involve direct
solicitation of buyers of securities.' 9 The Pinter test of section 12 liability
requires the attorneys, accountants and investment bankers to solicit directly
an offer to buy securities from their clients. 92 Although the Pinter test
narrows the test for determining section 12 seller liability, certain ambiguities
arise from the language of the test. 93 First, the Pinter Court did not define
the level of participation in a sales transaction that qualifies as solicitation
of an offer to buy securities. 94 The Pinter Court stated that securities
brokers solicit sales of securities. 95 The Pinter Court also stated that
attorneys who merely perform legal services do not qualify as sellers. 96 The
Pinter court did not explain, however, the level of participation between
the two extremes that will qualify an individual as a seller under section
12. 197 Second, the requirement that financial benefit must accrue to the
seller or owner as a result of an offer to buy securities is ambiguous because
the Pinter Court did not define financial benefit. 98 Thus after Pinter,
federal courts must decide on their own, within limits, the level of involve-
189. See Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding
that investment banker's role in arrangement of limited partnerships sold to plaintiffs was
substantial factor in causing sale of securities).
190. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (discussing application of § 12 to
accountants, investment bankers, and attorneys).
191. See Murphy and Weiss, Decision Clarifies Who is Liable In Sales of Unregistered
Securities, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 3, 1988, at 20, col. 2. (discussing narrowing affect of Pinter
decision especially concerning courts formerly applying substantial factor test and impact of
Pinter decision on securities professionals).
192. See Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2078 (1988) (stating solicitation as requirement
for § 12 liability).
193. Weiss & Murphy, supra note 191, at 20, col. 2.
194. Id. at 21, col. 1. Commentators have speculated that after Pinter parties will litigate
the question of whether participants in a securities transaction solicited a sale of securities.
Id. Since the Pinter decision, several defendants in § 12 actions have argued that the defendants
did not qualify as § 12 sellers under the Pinter test because the defendants did not solicit
offers to buy the securities. See Lee v. Spicola, [Current Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,120
at 91,263-264 (M.D.Fla. Dec. 9, 1988) (motioning for summary judgment on theory that
defendant did not solicit offer to buy securities); Jackson v. First Federal Savings of Arkansas,
[Current Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,123 at 91,307 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 15, 1988)
(accepting defendants argument that defendants did not qualify as a § 12(2) seller because
plaintiff failed to plead that defendant solicited purchase of securities from plaintiffs).
195. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2078 (1988). Although the Pinter Court did not
define solicitation, the Pinter Court found that when a securities broker contacts an investor
and convinces the investor to purchase securities, the broker's actions qualify as soliciting an
offer to buy securities. Id.
196. Id.
197. Murpy & Weiss, supra note 191, at 21, col. 1.
198. See id. (concluding that federal courts will define on their own what constitutes
solicitation and financial benefit).
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ment in a securities sales transaction and the type of financial gain that will
qualify an individual as a section 12 seller.199
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Pinter in June 1988, several
federal circuit courts have considered whether an individual qualifies as a
seller under section 12.200 In Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co. 20 1 the Fifth
Circuit applied the Pinter test to evaluate the question of a defendant's
liability under section 12.202 In Abell the defendant, a real estate developer,
created a nonprofit corporation, Westside, for the care of severely mentally
and emotionally disturbed individuals. 20 3 The developer funded the project
by issuing municipal bonds.204 The second defendant in Abell, a law firm,
acted as counsel in preparing the bond offering. 2 5 The plaintiffs in Abell
purchased Westside bonds from a securities broker2 6 Soon after Westside
issued the bonds, Westside's financial structure began to deteriorate and
eventually the underwriter revealed to the bondholders all the information
that the developer had originally withheld from the bondholders. 20 7 After
the underwriter disclosed the fact that the offering materials were incorrect,
the plaintiffs commenced an action in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana against the developer and the law firm.
20
1
The plaintiffs claimed that because the developer and the law firm developed
Westside, the defendants' actions were substantial factors in causing the
issuance of the Westside bonds that the plaintiffs purchased. 209 The plain-
199. See infra notes 200-46 and accompanying text (discussing subsequent federal court
opinions attempting to delineate what activities constitute solicitation).
200. See id. (discussing decision of Fifth Circuit in Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., Second
Circuit in Capri v. Murphy and Ninth Circuit in Harleson v. Miller Fin. Corp.).
201. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988).
202. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1113 (5th Cir. 1988).
203. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1109. The developer in Abell purchased seven acres of land and
a thirty year old vacant school building in Cheneyville, Louisiana for $100,000. Id.
204. Id. at 1110. The developer in Abell incorporated Westside with the intent of financing
the corporation initially with a sale of municipal bonds. Id. The developer convinced the town
of Cheneyvile to back a $13,550,000 municipal bond issue for Westside. Id.
205. Id. at 1111. The underwriter for the Westside project hired the law firm of Wright,
Lindsey & Jennings (WLJ) to act as bond counsel for the project. Id. WLJ proceeded to do
a "due diligence" review of the underwriter's public offering materials to assure compliance
with federal securities laws. Id. WLJ failed, however, to discover a feasibility study prepared
before WLJ joined the project. Id. The feasibility study concluded that the Westside project
was unfeasible because the Westside project depended on Medicaid for revenue. Id. WLJ
prepared and distributed the offering materials without mention of the unfavorable feasibility
study. Id.
206. Id. at 1112.
207. Id.
208. Id. In Abell, two months after the plaintiffs commenced the suit against the developer
and WLJ, Westside filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. Id. The bankruptcy court
restructured the interest on the bonds by reducing the annual interests from approximately
16% to approximately 10% on most of the bonds. Id. As a result of the reduction in the
annual yield of Westside's bonds, the Westside bondholders suffered a significant reduction
in income. Id.
209. Id. at 1115.
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tiffs, therefore, claimed that the defendants were liable under section 12
because the defendants were a substantial factor in causing the sale of
securities. 210 The district court, in Abell, entered judgment for the plain-
tiffs. 211 The defendants appealed the district court decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
212
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the defendants argued that the defendants
did not qualify as section 12 sellers. 2 3 In deciding Abell the Fifth Circuit
relied on Pinter to determine whether the defendants qualified as section
12 sellers. 214 The Abell court decided that under Pinter a court should make
two inquiries to determine whether an individual qualifies as a section 12
seller. 215 According to the Abell court, the first inquiry considers whether
the defendant passed title to the securities to a purchaser or solicited the
transaction in which title passed to the purchaser. 216 The second inquiry
asks whether the purchaser bought the securities from the defendant. 217 The
Abell court noted that if a person solicited an offer to buy, the person also
must have solicited the sale because of a desire to benefit the person or the
owner of the securities to qualify as a seller under section 12.218 The Fifth
Circuit found in Abell that title to the Westside bonds and the solicitation
of the offers to buy the bonds came from the underwriter and the previous
owners of the bonds. 2 9 The Abell court further found that none of the
plaintiffs purchased Westside bonds from the developer or the law firm
that prepared the offering materialsYm The Abell court held, therefore, that
the defendants were not liable as sellers under section 12 of the Securities





213. Id. at 1113. The Abell court noted that the defendants asserted a valid defense by
claiming not to qualify as sellers because only sellers of securities are liable under § 12. Id.
214. Id. at 1113.
215. Id.
216. Id. In deciding Abell, the Fifth Circuit stated that determining whether a defendant
passed title to the securities is possible by referring to common principles of privity. Id. The
Abell court stated that determining whether a defendant solicited an offer to buy is possible
by legal parsing and linguistic analysis of § 2(3) of the Securities Act defining the term "offer
to sell". Id.
217. Id. The Abell court concluded that because the Securities Act does not define the
term "purchase" a court must apply the common meaning of the term purchase. Id.
218. See id. at 1114 (quoting directly Pinter requirement that seller of securities must be
motivated by financial benefit to seller or to owner of securities).
219. Id. The Fifth Circuit in Abell stated that the activities of a corporate developer,
unlike the activities of an underwriter hired to sell securities, do not qualify as solicitation
merely because the developer was a substantial factor in creating the corporation. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1115. In addition to claiming that the defendants were sellers under the Pinter
test, the plaintiffs in Abell also claimed that Pinter applies only to § 12(1) actions. Id. The
plaintiffs noted that Pinter dealt with § 12(1) claims and that the Pinter Court expressed no
REDUCTION IN SELLER LIABILITY
By applying the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Pinter test to the
facts in Abell, the Fifth Circuit excluded from liability individuals that may
have qualified as section 12 sellers when the Fifth Circuit employed the
substantial factor test to determine section 12 liability.tM For instance, a
jury reasonably could conclude that without the developer's assistance the
Westside bond offering would not have occurred. 223 Because the developer's
assistance was a necessary element of the bond offering, a jury could
conclude that the developer's actions were a substantial factor in causing
the offering to occur. 224 Accordingly, under the substantial facotr test, a
jury could have found that the developer constituted a section 12 seller
under the substantial factor test.m Instead of the substantial factor test,
however, the Fifth Circuit applied the Pinter test and found the developer
not liable.226 Thus, the Pinter test appears to narrow the scope of persons
who qualify as section 12 sellers by limiting the definition of section 12
seller to individuals who actually solicit the purchase of securities or actually
pass title to securities and not extending the definintion to individuals who
are merely substantial factors in causing the sale of securities. 227
opinion as to § 12(2) claims. Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs claimed that the Abell court should
not apply the substantial factor test to the plaintiffs' § 12(2) claim. Id. The Abell court,
however, rejected the plaintiffs contention that Pinter only applies to § 12(1) claims because
the plain language of subsections (1) and (2) concerning seller status is exactly the same. Id.
See supra note 2 (setting forth langauage of §§ 12(1) and 12(2)).
222. Id. at 1114-1115; See supra notes 247-251 and accompanying text (explaining that
under Fifth Circuit's application of substantial factor test individuals constitute sellers under
§ 12 simply by having substantial involvement with corporation that issues securities).
223. See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text (discussing developer's involvement
in creating Westside).
224. See id. (discussing substantial involvement of both defendants in Abell which jury
could construe as substantial factor in causing sale of securities).
225. See supra notes 205-212 and accompanying text (revealing that under facts in Abell,
developer was not only substantial factor in bond offering but director also constituted primary
factor in bond offering).
226. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1115.
227. See Murphy & Weiss, supra note 191, at 20, col. 4. (discussing reasons why Pinter
test is more narrow than substantial factor test); Commins v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., [Current
Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,092 at 91,096 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1988). The
decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in Commins
demonstrates the narrowing effect of the Pinter test in comparison to the substantial factor
test. Commins, [Current Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,092 at 91,096. In Commins
the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, therefore, the district court considered the facts alleged
by the plaintiff in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Commins, [Current Decisions] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,092 at 91,099. In Commins the plaintiff alleged in the complaint
that the attorney involved in a securities sales transaction violated both § 12(1) and § 12(2) of
the Securities Act. Id. at 91,103. The plaintiff alleged that the attorney prepared portions of
the placement memoranda and advised persons selling the stock to the plaintiffs. Id. The
plaintiffs also alleged that one of the plaintiffs telephoned, and the attorney told the plaintiff
that the corporation selling the securities was legitimate. Id. Applying the Pinter test to the
facts of Commins, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs § 12(1) claim stating that the
attorney's limited contact with the plaintiff did not constitute solicitation. Id. However, when
the district court considered the plaintiffs § 12(2) claim against the attorney the district court
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Like the Fifth Circuit in Abell, the Ninth Circuit in Harelson v. Miller
Financial Corporation22s considered which persons qualify as section 12
sellers subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Pinter. 229 In Harelson
the defendant, Wilson, worked as a salesman for the Carter Company, a
company that bought and serviced the promissory notes of doctors.?0
Harelson contacted Wilson and arranged an appointment to talk about the
benefits of investing in the Carter Company. 231 After meeting with Wilson
and listening to Wilson's sales pitch, Harleson invested in the Carter
Company by purchasing promissory notes from the Carter Company.
2
Within a year of Harelson's purchase of the promissory notes, the Carter
Company defaulted and Harelson's notes became worthless?23 Harelson
commenced an action against Wilson in the United State District Court for
the Northern District of California. 234 Harelson alleged that Wilson violated
section 12(1) of the Securities Act by selling unregistered securities to
Harelson. 2 5 The district court found that Wilson qualified as a seller under
section 12, and that the Carter Company never registered the securities?2
36
The district court, therefore, held Wilson liable under section 12(1).237 Wilson
appealed the decision of the district court to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
238
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Wilson argued that he did not qualify
as a seller of securities. 239 The Ninth Circuit found that Wilson represented
the typical American salesman who earns a commission on every sale.M"
applied the substantial factor test. Id. The district court reasoned that the Pinter test only
applies to § 12(1) actions because the Pinter decision involved a § 12(1) claim. Id. The district
court reasoned further that because the Ninth Circuit employed the substantial factor test in
§ 12(2) cases prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Pinter, the district court must employ
the substantial factor test when evaluating a § 12(2) claim. Id. The district court noted that
on the facts alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint a jury reasonably could conclude that the
attorney was a substantial factor in causing the sales transaction to occur. Id. Therefore, the
district court denied the attorney's motion to dismiss the § 12(2) claim. Id.
228. 854 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 274 (1988).
229. Harelson v. Miller Fin. Corp., 854 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 274
(1988).
230. Harelson, 854 F.2d at 1141. In Harelson the Carter Company paid Wilson a
commission for every promissory note that Wilson sold. Id.
231. Id. at 1142.
232. Id. In Harelson, Wilson used brochures produced by the Carter Company to convince
individuals to purchase stock in the Carter Company. Id. Wilson told Harelson that the
expected return on investment in the Carter Company ranged from twenty to thirty percent
annually. Id. Wilson also told Harelson that the Carter Company always paid investors. Id.
233. Id. In Harelson Harelson invested $34,500 in the Carter Company and another
plaintiff invested $13,000. Id.





239. Id. Wilson argued in Harelson that Wilson did not qualify as a § 12 seller because
the purchasers sought out Wilson instead of Wilson seeking out the purchasers. Id.
240. Id.
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Although Wilson did not seek out Harelson in an effort to make a sale,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Wilson used all the measures within
Wilson's power to convince Harleson to purchase the unregistered promis-
sory notes when Harleson came to Wilson's office.2 41 Finding that Wilson
was a typical salesman, the Harelson court reasoned that Wilson's activities
were classic examples of solicitation.242 The court held that Wilson qualified
as a seller of unregistered securities and, therefore, held Wilson liable under
section 12.24 The Harelson court declined to discuss the application of the
Pinter test in great detail. The Ninth Circuit in Harelson believed that
the record presented such a clear case of solicitation that the Ninth Circuit
devoted one sentence of reasoning to the subject of solicitation stating that
Wilson solicited the sale and Wilson was the seller. 45 The limited reasoning
of the Harelson decision provides little guidance to anyone attempting to
discern the limits of solicitation or the financial benefit needed to qualify
a defendant as a section 12 seller. 46
241. Id. The Fifth Ciruit in Harelson noted that Wilson presented no more than the basic
facts necessary to effectuate the sale. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1142.
244. Id.
245. See id. (stating that Wilson solicited sale of securities by using Wilson's skills of
persuasion).
246. See id. (presenting reasoning of Ninth Circuit in one paragraph in which Ninth
Circuit mostly repeats relevant facts from trial record). In addition to the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Abell and the Ninth Circuits decision in Harelson the Second Circuit considered
the meaning of the term seller after the Supreme Court's decision in Pinter. Capri v. Murphy,
856 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1988). In Capri the plaintiffs purchased limited partnerships in Greenwich
Coal Associates (GCA). Id. at 475. The defendants, Murphy and Greenwich Coal Company
(GCC) were the two general partners in GCA. Id. Murphy and GCC formed GCA for the
purpose of exploiting coal mining properties in West Virginia. Id. Murphy hired an engineering
company to study the feasibility of mining the West Virginia coal properties. Id. at 476. The
feasibility study overvalued GCA because the report failed to take certain expenses into
account. Id. at 475-476. Even though Murphy knew the study was overly optimistic, Murphy
used the feasibility study in the GCA offering materials. Id. at 476. An attorney whose law
firm assisted in drafting the offering materials and performed other legal work in the venture
directly contacted the plaintiffs who purchased securities in GCA. Id. at 478. The coal mining
venture never materialized and the plaintiffs securities became worthless. Id. The plaintiffs
commenced an action against Murphy and GCA in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut. Id. The plaintiff alleged that Murphy and GCC, as the general partners
of GCA, violated § 12(2) of the Securities Act by making material misstatements of fact in
the sale of the securities. Id. at 476. The district court entered judgment for the defendants
and the plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id.
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Murphy and GCC argued that Murphy and GCC were
not seller's under § 12 because Murphy and GCC never contacted the plaintiffs in connection
with the sale of the securities. Id. Murphy and GCC argued further that the attorney should
bear full responsibility under § 12 because the attorney contacted the plaintiffs. Id. In deciding
Capri the Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pinter. Id. at 478. The
Capri court repeated the language of the Pinter decision and stated that only individuals who
solicit the purchase of securities motivated by financial gain for themselves or the owner of
the securities are liable as sellers under § 12. Id. The Capri court reasoned that by preparing
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As Harelson, Abell and various other cases illustrate, many different
grades of participation in a sale of securities may qualify as solicitation. 4 7
Even under the Pinter test, attorneys or securities professionals must remain
sensitive to the level of interaction between the securities professional and
potential purchasers of securities2 48 For instance, if a client hires an attorney
to do the legal work on a private offering of a company's securities and
the attorney introduces the client to a potential buyer, the attorney's actions
may qualify as solicitation.2 9 Furthermore, payment of an attorney to do
legal work for a company issuing securities may satisfy the financial benefit
criterion of the Pinter test.2 10 Although questions remain after Pinter con-
cerning the extent of participation that qualifies as solicitation and the type
of benefit that qualifies as financial benefit to the seller, securities profes-
sionals can remain confident that simply completing the legal or financial
work necessary for the sale of the securities will not subject the securities
professional to section 12 liability. 25'
and circulating the offering materials to plaintiffs, Murphy and GCC solicited the purchases
of the plaintiffs. Id. The Capri court, therefore, held Murphy and GCC liable as § 12 sellers.
Id. The Capri court also noted that the attorney would have qualified as a seller, however,
the plaintiffs failed to name the attorney as a defendant. Id.
By imposing § 12 liability on a defendant for merely distributing offering materials to
potential purchasers the Second Circuit sets a low standard for the types of actions that qualify
as soliciting an offer to buy. Id. The Capri court concluded that the defendants were liable
as § 12 sellers even though the defendants never contacted the plaintiffs. Id. The behavior
that qualified the defendants as § 12 sellers in Capri is the type of behavior that the Pinter
decision appears to exclude from the definition of the term seller. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct.
2063, 2078 (1988). The Pinter Court stated that courts considering whether a defendant
qualifies as a § 12 seller should investigate the relationship between the defendant and the
plaintiff and not the defendants general relationship to the transaction. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at
2081. In Capri the court focused on the defendant's relationship to the transaction instead of
focusing on the defendant's relationship to the plaintiff. Capri, 856 F.2d at 478. Because
Murphy and GCC prepared the prospectus circulated by the attorney to the plaintiffs, the
Capri court concluded that Murphy and GCC solicited offers to buy the securities from the
plaintiffs. Id. The Pinter Court's dicta excluding from liability persons merely performing
services, such as drafting offering materials, clearly rejects the idea that defendants similar to
Murphy and GCC qualify as § 12 sellers. Pinter, 108 S.Ct. at 2081.
247. See supra notes 132-37 and accompany text (providing examples of participation of
alleged § 12 sellers in pre-Pinter § 12 cases); supra notes 200-46 and accompanying text
(providing examples of participation of alleged sellers in post-Pinter cases).
248. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguities that remain
after Pinter concerning degree of activity that qualifies as solicitation).
249. See Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that an attorney
working on legal aspect of offering who has direct contact with purchasers may qualify as
soliciting offers to buy securities). But see Commins v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., [Current
Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,092 at 91,103 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1988) (dismissing
a § 12(1) action against an attorney completing legal services for an offering because the
attorney merely responded to purchaser question over telephone); supra note 227 (setting forth
facts and holding of Commins).
250. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2078 (1988).
251. See id. at 2081 (stating that securities professionals do not qualify as § 12 sellers
when securities professionals engage in pro forma activities).
REDUCTION IN SELLER LIABILITY
Applying the Pinter test and the substantial factor test to two examples
of attorney involvement in a securities transaction illustrates the narrowing
effect of the Pinter testy 2 In the first situation, Attorney A drafts a
prospectus and promotes the sale of securities by directly contacting potential
purchasers of the securities in an effort to persuade the potential purchasers
to buy the securities. 3 Because Attorney A goes beyond merely completing
the legal work for the issuer of the securities and actually promotes the sale
of the securities by contacting purchasers, Attorney A effectively solicits
the purchases of securities. 4 At the same time, Attorney A has solicited
the sale of the securities on account of personal financial benefit because
the issuer of the securities paid Attorney A for Attorney A's legal servicesY 5
Thus, under the Pinter test Attorney A may qualify as a section 12 seller
because court's might find that Attorney A solicited the purchase of
securities and that he was motivated by a desire to benefit himself finan-
cially. "5s Additionally, under the substantial factor test Attorney A qualifies
as a section 12 seller because Attorney A's actions were a substantial factor
in causing the sale of the securities.
7
In contrast to Attorney A, consider the involvement of Attorney B in
a sale of securitiesY5 In the second situation a developer hires Attorney B
to complete the legal work necessary to make a private offering of limited
partnershipsY 9 Attorney B prepares all of the offering materials including
an opinion letter stating that the securities are exempt from registration
with the SEC. 260 The developer needs the prospectus and opinion letter to
persuade potential purchasers that the limited partnerships are a sound
investment.Y' In the second situation, however, Attorney B never personally
contacts potential purchasers.2 2 Additionally, Attorney B never contacts or
252. See infra notes 252-57 and accompanying text (providing hypothetical example of
liability under Pinter test and substantial factor test).
253. See Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 476 (2d Cir. 1988) (involving facts similar to
facts in hypothetical in text).
254. See id. at 478 (concluding that attorney in circumstances similar to hypothetical
solicited an offer to buy from purchasers).
255. See id. (concluding that attorney benefitted personally from sale of securities because
issuer paid attorney); Lee v. Spicola, [Current Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,120
at 91,264 (stating that accountant who was employee of issuer financially benefitted from sale
of securities).
256. See Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2079 (1988) (stating appropriate test for deter-
mining § 12(1) seller status).
257. See Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating substantial factor
test); supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text (discussing Pharo court's formulation and
application of substantial factor test).
258. See infra notes 259-68 and accompanying text (providing hypothetical alternative to
Attorny A's involvement in sale of securities).
259. See Koehler v. Pulvers, [1985-1986] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,232 at 91,660
(involving facts similar to facts in hypothetical in text).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 91,661.
262. Id. at 91,660-663.
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introduces the issuer of the securities to potential purchasers or urges the
potential purchasers to buy the securities. 26 Under the Pinter test Attorney
B fails to qualify as a section 12 seller because Attorney B did not solicit
the purchase of securities from the purchasers nor did Attorney B pass title
to the securities to the pltrchasers. 264 Instead, Attorney B merely completed
the legal work necessary to make the offering. 265 Under the substantial
factor test, however, Attorney B qualifies as a section 12 seller.26 Attorney
B qualifies as a section 12 seller under the substantial factor test because
Attorney B's opinion letter and prospectus were substantial factors in making
the offering and convincing the purchasers to buy the securities. 267 Because
the Pinter test denies section 12 seller status to Attorney B and the substantial
factor test subjects Attorney B to section 12 seller status, the Pinter test
effectively reduces the possibility of section 12 liability extending to securities
professionals.2
61
The Supreme Court's decision in Pinter marks a return to a narrow
interpretation of who consitutes a section 12 seller. 269 The Pinter decision
rejects the more expansive substantial factor test as a means of discerning
section 12 sellers. 270 In place of the substantial factor test, the Pinter decision
presents a two-part test for determining whether an individual qualifies as
a section 12 seller. 271 First, an individual qualifies as a seller if the individual
passes title of the securities to the purchaser. 272 Second, an individual
qualifies as a seller if the individual solicits an offer to buy for the
individual's benefit or the benefit of the owner of the securities. 273 The
Pinter test is not flawless because the Supreme Court did not comment on
the question of how much participation in the sale of securities constitutes
263. Id.
264. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining Pinter test's requirement of
solicitation).
265. See Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2079 (1988) (stating that mere performance of
legal duties necessary in drafting prospectus or preparing offering materials is not enough to
invoke § 12(1) seller status).
266. See Koehler v. Pulvers, [1985-1986] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,232 at 91,666
(holding attorney liable under similar circumstances as set forth in hypothetical).
267. See id. (concluding that attorney is liable under § 12 for completing offering mate-
rials).
268. See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text (explaining that Supreme Court's
decision in Pinter appears to narrow definition of term seller under § 12 of Securities Act).
269. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing statutory interpretation of
§ 12 in 1940 Cady decision); supra note 173 (comparing Cady decision to Pinter decision).
270. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text (discussing Pinter Court's rejection
of substantial factor test).
271. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (discussing Pinter test for determining
§ 12 seller status).
272. See supra notes 166 and accompanying text (discussing Pinter Court's statement that
an individual who passes title of securities to buyer qualifies as seller).
273. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text (discussing Pinter test's requirement
of solicitation of offer to buy securities).
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solicitation and what qualifies as a financial benefit.2 74 However, the Printer
test does provide one test to replace the four different tests applied by
federal courts of appeal prior to the Pinter decision.2 7 5 Additionally, the
Pinter test appears to narrow the scope of liability for claims arising under
section 12.276 The narrowing of the scope of section 12 liability is obvious
good news for securities professionals considering whether their activities
fall within the ambit of a section 12 seller.
David L. Goode
274. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguities created by
Pinter test).
275. See supra notes 200-46 and accompanying text (discussing federal appeals courts
application of different tests for determining § 12 seller status).
276. See supra notes 247-68 and accompanying test (discussing narrowing effect of Pinter
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